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IN THE YEARS OF THE Second World War, Berlin became a hub of global anti-imperial 
revolutionary activism. Between 1941 and 1945, scores of anticolonial leaders flocked 
to Germany, among them Indians, most famously Subhas Chandra Bose; prominent 
Arabs, including the Iraqi nationalist Rashid ʿAli al-Kaylani, the Syrian rebel leader 
Fawzi al-Qawuqji, and Amin al-Husayni, the notorious Mufti of Jerusalem; Irish 
radicals, such as Seán Russell; and nationalist revolutionaries from Central Asia and 
the Caucasus—Turkestanis, Azerbaijanis, Chechens, and others. One of these men, the 
Arab nationalist Yunus Bahri, exulted in his memoirs about wartime Germany’s 
anticolonial international: “Delegations from oppressed, colonized, and occupied lands 
such as the Maghrib, Russia, the Arab lands, and India were coming to Berlin, which 
was victorious on all battlefields.”1 Many of them saw Germany as an ally in their 
struggle for a new world order. They set up political committees. They published their 
own papers. They convened congresses, calling for the liberation of the oppressed 
peoples. Some even made efforts to organize military and paramilitary units. The Nazi 
regime increasingly tried to employ these groups politically. Although Berlin never 
established anything like the Communist International or Japan’s pan-Asian alliance, it 
did make substantial efforts to mobilize anticolonial movements. 
 To date, this anticolonial international has received little attention.2 In fact, 
historians have often dismissed Germany’s cooperation with anticolonial nationalists 
                                                 
1 Yunus Bahri, Huna Birlin! Hayya al-ʿArab! [This Is Berlin! Long Live the Arabs!], 
vol. 3: Hitlir waʾl-Shuyuʾiyya [Hitler and Communism] (Beirut, n.d.), 87. 
2 Historians have so far mainly studied some individual anticolonial nationalists who 
came to Germany during the war in isolation, and not as part of a broader phenomenon. 
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during the Second World War as insignificant, assuming that the regime’s racism and 
uncompromising policies did not leave room for such alliances.3 It was “Hitler’s brutal 
                                                                                                                                             
On al-Husayni, see Klaus Gensicke, The Mufti of Jerusalem and the Nazis: The Berlin 
Years, 1941–1945, trans. Alexander Fraser Gunn (London, 2011). On Bose, see 
Romain Hayes, Subhas Chandra Bose in Nazi Germany: Politics, Intelligence and 
Propaganda, 1941–43 (London, 2011); Jan Kuhlmann, Netaji in Europe, trans. 
Christel Das (New Delhi, 2012); and Sugata Bose, His Majesty’s Opponent: Subhas 
Chandra Bose and India’s Struggle against Empire (Cambridge, Mass., 2012), chap. 7. 
On Soviet nationalists, see Patrik von zur Mühlen, Zwischen Hakenkreuz und 
Sowjetstern: Der Nationalismus der sowjetischen Orientvölker im Zweiten Weltkrieg 
(Düsseldorf, 1971). And on Irish nationalists, see Carolle J. Carter, The Shamrock and 
the Swastika: German Espionage in Ireland in World War II (Palo Alto, Calif., 1977), 
chaps. 8–11. Some important thoughts from a comparative perspective are offered by 
Daniel Brückenhaus, Policing Transnational Protest: Liberal Imperialism and the 
Surveillance of Anticolonialists in Europe, 1905–1945 (Oxford, 2017), 187–194. 
Similarly, Germany’s engagements in colonial and semicolonial territories have mainly 
been studied in isolation. On India, see Reimund Schnabel, Tiger und Schakal: 
Deutsche Indienpolitik, 1941–1943 (Vienna, 1968); and Milan Hauner, India in Axis 
Strategy: Germany, Japan, and Indian Nationalists in the Second World War 
(Stuttgart, 1981). On the Middle East, see Bernd Philipp Schröder, Deutschland und 
der Mittlere Osten im Zweiten Weltkrieg (Göttingen, 1975); Heinz Tillmann, 
Deutschlands Araberpolitik im Zweiten Weltkrieg (East Berlin, 1965); Łukasz 
Hirszowicz, The Third Reich and the Arab East (London, 1966); and Francis R. 
Nicosia, Nazi Germany and the Arab World (Cambridge, 2014). On Central Asia and 
the Caucasus, see Mühlen, Zwischen Hakenkreuz und Sowjetstern. And on Ireland, see 
Carter, The Shamrock and the Swastika. 
3 Milan Hauner noted that “the unique opportunity of encouraging anti-Western 
uprisings” in the colonial world “was not exploited,” see Hauner, “The Professionals 
and the Amateurs in National Socialist Foreign Policy: Revolution and Subversion in 
the Islamic and Indian World,” in Gerhard Hirschfeld and Lothar Kettenacker, eds., 
The “Führer State”: Myth and Reality—Studies on the Structure and Politics of the 
Third Reich (Stuttgart, 1981), 305–328, here 326. 
 3 
‘realism,’” Mark Mazower claims, that “deprived the Germans of the chance of 
exploiting nationalism as a tool of political warfare” in North Africa, the Middle East, 
South Asia, and beyond.4 Historians of empire have generally concurred. Jane Burbank 
and Frederick Cooper assure us that “Hitler”—for “ideological as well as practical 
reasons”—did not engage “effectively” in “the colonies of the countries Germany 
conquered” and “failed to make a systematic effort” to confront British imperialism.5 
The reality was more complicated. Although the Nazi leadership initially showed little 
interest in the colonial world, in practice, as the tide of war turned against the Axis, 
various competing wings of the regime, for pragmatic reasons, began engaging in anti-
imperial policies. This, in turn, provided anticolonial nationalists who were willing to 
work with Hitler’s Germany with remarkable opportunities to organize their struggles. 
Using the room and resources provided by Berlin, they forged a radical international 
against empire, characterized by transnational militancy and anticolonial solidarity. 
 This story can be seen as an episode in a wider history. As nationalist 
movements across the imperial world gained momentum in the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries, governments increasingly made efforts to support them in order to 
undermine the sovereignty of their adversaries’ empires.6 The list of examples is long. 
                                                 
4 Mark Mazower, Hitler’s Empire: Nazi Rule in Occupied Europe (London, 2008), 
588–590, quote from 588. 
5 Jane Burbank and Frederick Cooper, Empires in World History: Power and the 
Politics of Difference (Princeton, N.J., 2010), 405. 
6 On the Crimean War, see Mara Kozelsky, “Casualties of Conflict: Crimean Tatars 
during the Crimean War,” Slavic Review 67, no. 4 (2008): 866–891. On the Austro-
Prussian War, see Andreas Kienast, Die Legion Klapka: Eine Episode aus dem Jahre 
1866 und ihre Vorgeschichte (Vienna, 1900). On Imperial Germany’s courtship of 
anti-imperial movements in the First World War, see Fritz Fischer, Germany’s Aims in 
the First World War (New York, 1967); and, reassessing Fischer’s contribution on the 
 4 
During the Crimean War, the British, French, and Ottoman empires supported national 
minorities in the southern borderlands of the Tsarist Empire. In the Austro-Prussian 
War, the Prussian military armed Hungarian nationalists against the Habsburg Empire. 
The most significant efforts were made during the First World War, when London 
aided Arab independence movements in the Ottoman Empire; St. Petersburg supported 
Armenian, Kurdish, Assyrian, and other nationalists in the Ottoman Empire; Istanbul 
assisted Turkic revolutionaries in the Tsarist Empire; and Berlin launched a major anti-
imperial scheme, backing nationalists in Poland, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Turkestan, 
Flanders, Ireland, Egypt, India, and beyond. As nationalism became the hegemonic 
discourse of sovereignty, the political order of multinational polities could be 
                                                                                                                                             
subject, Jennifer Jenkins, “Fritz Fischer’s ‘Programme for Revolution’: Implications 
for a Global History of Germany in the First World War,” Journal of Contemporary 
History 48, no. 2 (2013): 397–417; and, providing more specific studies, Donald M. 
McKale, War by Revolution: Germany and Great Britain in the Middle East in the Era 
of World War I (Kent, Ohio, 1998); Seppo Zetterberg, Die Liga der Fremdvölker 
Russlands, 1916–1918: Ein Beitrag zu Deutschlands antirussischem Propagandakrieg 
unter den Fremdvölkern Russlands im Ersten Weltkrieg (Helsinki, 1978); and Reinhard 
R. Doerries, “Introduction,” in Doerries, ed., Prelude to the Easter Rising: Sir Roger 
Casement in Imperial Germany (London, 2000), 1–31. On British support for Arab 
nationalists in the Ottoman Empire in the years of the First World War, see Eliezer 
Tauber, The Arab Movements in World War I (London, 1993). On tsarist and Ottoman 
policies toward national groups in their respective states during the First World War, 
see David Gaunt, Massacres, Resistance, Protectors: Muslim-Christian Relations in 
Eastern Anatolia during World War I (Piscataway, N.J., 2006); Janet Klein, The 
Margins of Empire: Kurdish Militias in the Ottoman Tribal Zone (Stanford, Calif., 
2011); and Michael A. Reynolds, Shattering Empires: The Clash and Collapse of the 
Ottoman and Russian Empires, 1908–1918 (Cambridge, 2011). 
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challenged from both within and without.7 In consequence, great power patronage of 
anti-imperial nationalist movements emerged as a major phenomenon in world politics, 
fundamentally challenging the existing relationship between sovereignty and 
territoriality.8 This phenomenon was part of a more general shift in the global order 
that took place throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, “from traditional 
diplomacy to population politics,” as Eric Weitz put it—“from mere territorial 
adjustments to the handling of entire population groups categorized by ethnicity, 
nationality, or race, or some combination thereof.”9 
 On the other side, the regime was attractive to the anticolonial nationalists who 
came to Berlin for a variety of reasons, both pragmatic and ideological. (Often these 
motivations were interconnected, although to some, one was more important than the 
other.) In pragmatic terms, it appeared to be a powerful ally against mutual enemies. In 
ideological terms, it represented the primacy of the nation and offered an alternative to 
the liberal imperial world order. It stood for a global order based on nation-states, not 
multiethnic empires. Moreover, to many of the anticolonialists, the regime had a 
                                                 
7 Geoff Eley and Ronald Grigor Suny, “Introduction: From the Moment of Social 
History to the Work of Cultural Representation,” in Eley and Suny, eds., Becoming 
National: A Reader (Oxford, 1996), 3–38, here 19. 
8 On this reconfiguration of territoriality and changes in the political geography of 
allegiance, see Charles S. Maier, “Consigning the Twentieth Century to History: 
Alternative Narratives for the Modern Era,” American Historical Review 105, no. 3 
(June 2000): 807–831; and, more detailed, Maier, Once within Borders: Territories of 
Power, Wealth, and Belonging since 1500 (Cambridge, Mass., 2016). 
9 Eric D. Weitz, “From the Vienna to the Paris System: International Politics and the 
Entangled Histories of Human Rights, Forced Deportations, and Civilizing Missions,” 
American Historical Review 113, no. 5 (December 2008): 1313–1343, here 1314–
1315, quotes from 1314. 
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deeper ideological appeal, with its revolutionary nature, authoritarian nationalism, and 
anti-liberal vision of modernity. 
 Indeed, the story of Berlin’s anticolonial nationalists may shed some light on 
the often neglected larger phenomenon of the impact of the global authoritarian surge 
on anti-imperial movements during the interwar and war years. Following the 
“Wilsonian moment” in 1919, when hopes for national self-determination outside of 
Europe were shattered, many anticolonial nationalists, disillusioned with liberal 
universalism and the liberal world order, turned to more radical allies and ideologies to 
achieve national independence.10 Some embraced communism, spread by the cadres of 
the Communist International.11 Others turned to the new right-wing regimes, and at 
                                                 
10 Erez Manela, The Wilsonian Moment: Self-Determination and the International 
Origins of Anticolonial Nationalism (New York, 2007); and, focusing on India and 
China, Manela, “Imagining Woodrow Wilson in Asia: Dreams of East-West Harmony 
and the Revolt against Empire in 1919,” American Historical Review 111, no. 5 
(December 2006): 1327–1351. More generally, on the crisis of empire and visions of 
alternative world orders in the interwar years, see Susan Pedersen, The Guardians: The 
League of Nations and the Crisis of Empire (Oxford, 2015). 
11 Stephen White, “Colonial Revolution and the Communist International, 1919–
1924,” Science and Society 40, no. 2 (1976): 173–193; Ronald Grigor Suny, “‘Don’t 
Paint Nationalism Red’: National Revolution and Socialist Anti-Imperialism,” in 
Prasenjit Duara, ed., Decolonization: Perspectives from Now and Then (New York, 
2003), 176–198; Jean-François Fayet, “1919,” in S. A. Smith, ed., The Oxford 
Handbook of the History of Communism (Oxford, 2014), 109–124, especially 119–124; 
Fredrik Petersson, “Imperialism and the Communist International,” Journal of Labor 
and Society 20, no. 1 (2017): 23–42; and, more generally, Silvio Pons, The Global 
Revolution: A History of International Communism, 1917–1991, trans. Allan Cameron 
(Oxford, 2014), chap. 2. Susan D. Pennybacker, From Scottsboro to Munich: Race and 
Political Culture in 1930s Britain (Princeton, N.J., 2009), offers a brilliant case study 
providing insights into interwar left-wing anticolonialism. 
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times embraced authoritarian nationalist and revolutionary visions of modernity—their 
models were Turkish Kemalism, Italian Fascism, and German National Socialism.12 
 In this global authoritarian moment, the rising revolutionary nationalist regimes 
had great appeal among anticolonial nationalists. They were considered an opportunity 
because of their hostility to the Versailles system and their antagonism toward their 
imperial oppressors. Ideologically, they stood for the nation and for a world organized 
along national and racial lines, not by multinational empires or socialist 
internationality. Moreover, around the world, nationalist anticolonial movements were 
influenced by ideals of strong leadership, militarism, physical discipline, and 
collectivism, by authoritarian principles of governance, and by the veneration of 
violence, which appeared to be superior to the liberal values of individualism, 
parliamentarism, and democracy.13 Forging an authoritarian, anti-liberal 
                                                 
12 Cemil Aydin, The Politics of Anti-Westernism in Asia: Visions of World Order in 
Pan-Islamic and Pan-Asian Thought (New York, 2007), provides an important general 
account of these shifts from liberalism to nativism. Regional studies on right-wing and 
fascist anticolonial movements in the Middle East, South Asia, and beyond are 
discussed in the following note. 
13 A global history of fascism remains to be written. On North Africa and the Middle 
East, see Stefan Wild, “National Socialism in the Arab Near East between 1933 and 
1939,” Die Welt des Islams 25, no. 1/4 (1985): 126–173; Fritz Steppart, “Das Jahr 
1933 und seine Folgen für die arabischen Länder des Vorderen Orients,” in Gerhard 
Schulz, ed., Die große Krise der dreißiger Jahre: Vom Niedergang der Weltwirtschaft 
zum Zweiten Weltkrieg (Göttingen, 1985), 261–278; and Mikloš Mendel and Zdeněk 
Müller, “Fascist Tendencies in the Levant in the 1930s and 1940s,” Archív Orientální 
55, no. 1 (1987): 1–17; and, providing important case studies, Peter Wien, Iraqi Arab 
Nationalism: Authoritarian, Totalitarian, and Pro-Fascist Inclinations, 1932–1941 
(London, 2006); Götz Nordbruch, Nazism in Syria and Lebanon: The Ambivalence of 
the German Option, 1933–1945 (London, 2009); Edmond Cao-Van-Hoa, “Der Feind 
meines Feindes . . .”: Darstellungen des nationalsozialistischen Deutschland in 
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anticolonialism, the most extreme took direct inspiration from Fascism and Nazism—
from Syria’s Social Nationalists (al-Hizb al-Suri al-Qawmi al-Ijtimaʿi) and Lebanon’s 
Phalanges (al-Kataʾib) to India’s National Patriots (Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh), 
                                                                                                                                             
ägyptischen Schriften (Frankfurt a.M., 1990); Israel Gershoni and James Jankowski, 
Confronting Fascism in Egypt: Dictatorship versus Democracy in the 1930s (Stanford, 
Calif., 2010); and, on anti-fascist responses, the chapters in Israel Gershoni, ed., Arab 
Responses to Fascism and Nazism: Attraction and Repulsion (Austin, Tex., 2014). On 
South Asia, see Markus Daechsel, The Politics of Self-Expression: The Urdu Middle-
Class Milieu in Mid-Twentieth Century India and Pakistan (London, 2006); Tobias 
Delfs, Hindu-Nationalismus und europäischer Faschismus: Vergleich, Transfer- und 
Beziehungsgeschichte (Hamburg, 2008); and Maria Framke, Delhi-Rom-Berlin: Die 
indische Wahrnehmung von Faschismus und Nationalsozialismus, 1922–1939 
(Darmstadt, 2013); as well as Sumit Sarkar, “The Fascism of the Sangh Parivar,” 
Economic and Political Weekly 28, no. 5 (1993): 163–167; Mario Prayer, “Self, Other 
and alter idem: Bengali Internationalism and Fascist Italy in the 1920s and 30s,” 
Calcutta Historical Journal 26, no. 1 (2006): 1–32; Benjamin Zachariah, “Rethinking 
(the Absence of) Fascism in India, c. 1922–1945,” in Sugata Bose and Kris Manjapra, 
eds., Cosmopolitan Thought Zones: South Asia and the Global Circulation of Ideas 
(New York, 2010), 178–209; Zachariah, “A Voluntary Gleichschaltung? Perspectives 
from India towards a Non-Eurocentric Understanding of Fascism,” Transcultural 
Studies, no. 2 (2014): 63–100; and the contributions in Jairus Banaji, ed., Fascism: 
Essays on Europe and India (Delhi, 2013). On Indian Germanophilia more generally, 
see Kris Manjapra, Age of Entanglement: German and Indian Intellectuals across 
Empire (Cambridge, Mass., 2014). On Central Asia and the Caucasus, see Mühlen, 
Zwischen Hakenkreuz und Sowjetstern, 14–43. On Africa, see Patrick J. Furlong, 
Between Crown and Swastika: The Impact of the Radical Right on the Afrikaner 
Nationalist Movement in the Fascist Era (Hanover, N.H., 1991); Jonathan Derrick, 
Africa’s “Agitators”: Militant Anti-Colonialism in Africa and the West, 1918–1939 
(New York, 2008), 361–382; and, focusing on Italian Africa, Luigi Goglia, “Sulle 
organizzazioni fasciste indigene nelle colonie africane d’Italia,” in Giuliana Di Febo 
and Renato Moro, eds., Fascismo e franchismo: Relazioni, immagini, rappresentazioni 
(Soveria Mannelli, 2005), 173–212. 
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from the Young Egypt movement (Misr al-Fatah) to South Africa’s Afrikaner 
Oxwagon Guard (Ossewabrandwag), to name but a few. In the end, during the war, 
significant numbers of anticolonial nationalists supported the Axis. While anticolonial 
revolutionaries across Asia sided with Japan, others aligned themselves with Nazi 
Germany or Fascist Italy.14 Although they did not represent the majority of anticolonial 
nationalists, they nonetheless formed a significant global movement—and there is no 
better place to study this phenomenon than in the microcosm of wartime Berlin, where 
some of their key proponents assembled.15 
 While historians have shown much interest in the surge of anticolonial 
nationalist movements in the aftermath of the First World War, their works have 
mainly focused on nationalists who embraced (Wilsonian) liberalism and socialism. 
                                                 
14 Eri Hotta, Pan-Asianism and Japan’s War, 1931–1945 (New York, 2007), provides 
an overview of Japan’s wartime engagement with anticolonial nationalists. Other 
important works on the subject are Willard H. Elsbree, Japan’s Role in Southeast 
Asian Nationalist Movements, 1940 to 1945 (Cambridge, Mass., 1953); Joyce C. 
Lebra, “Introduction,” in Lebra, ed., Japan’s Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere 
in World War II: Selected Readings and Documents (Oxford, 1975), ix–xxi; Lebra, 
Japanese-Trained Armies in Southeast Asia (New York, 1977); and Jeremy A. Yellen, 
The Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere: When Total Empire Met Total War 
(Ithaca, N.Y., 2019). Renzo De Felice, Il fascismo e l’Oriente: Arabi, Ebrei e indiani 
nella politica di Mussolini (Bologna, 1988), offers insights into Italy’s engagement 
with Indian and Arab anticolonial nationalists. 
15 Gregory Mann has emphasized the role of locality as a unit of historical analysis in 
studying broader trends in colonial history. See Mann, “Locating Colonial Histories: 
Between France and West Africa,” American Historical Review 110, no. 2 (April 
2005): 409–434, here 410. For the context of a European metropolis, see Michael 
Goebel, “The Capital of the Men without a Country: Migrants and Anticolonialism in 
Interwar Paris,” American Historical Review 121, no. 5 (December 2016): 1444–1467; 
and, more generally, Goebel, Anti-Imperial Metropolis: Interwar Paris and the Seeds 
of Third-World Nationalism (Cambridge, 2015). 
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Less attention has been paid to those anticolonial revolutionaries who turned to right-
wing regimes and embraced a more extreme, authoritarian nationalism. We need to put 
this group back on our map. We can thereby draw on the trend in the study of anti-
imperial movements, reflected most notably in the works of Cemil Aydin, Erez 
Manela, and Michael Goebel, which has emphasized the importance of transnational 
and transimperial connections in the history of anti-imperial nationalism.16 
 United in their global struggle against the imperial world order, Berlin’s 
anticolonial revolutionaries formed a nationalist international against empire. 
Strikingly, this was an internationalism that takes us beyond conventional forms of 
liberal or socialist internationalism.17 Interacting across ethnic, national, and imperial 
boundaries, these nationalists were also remarkably cosmopolitan. While generations 
of scholars, from Jacques Derrida to Homi Bhabha, have studied the phenomenon of 
cosmopolitanism as both idea and practice, pointing to its various forms shaped by 
historical conditions, they have generally assumed it to be the opposite of 
                                                 
16 Aydin, The Politics of Anti-Westernism in Asia; Manela, The Wilsonian Moment; 
and Goebel, Anti-Imperial Metropolis. Elleke Boehmer, Empire, the National, and the 
Postcolonial, 1890–1920: Resistance in Interaction (Oxford, 2002), provides an 
excellent theoretical perspective on this history. 
17 Glenda Sluga, Internationalism in the Age of Nationalism (Philadelphia, 2013); 
Glenda Sluga and Patricia Clavin, eds., Internationalisms: A Twentieth-Century 
History (Cambridge, 2017); and the contributions in Ali Raza, Franziska Roy, and 
Benjamin Zachariah, eds., The Internationalist Moment: South Asia, Worlds, and 
World Views, 1917–39 (London, 2015). Yet fascist internationalism has been studied 
less, and even then it is considered as a European, not a global, phenomenon. 
Madeleine Herren, “Fascist Internationalism,” in Sluga and Clavin, Internationalisms, 
191–212, ignores the colonial world. Arnd Bauerkämper mentions it briefly in 
“Interwar Fascism in Europe and Beyond: Toward a Transnational Radical Right,” in 
Martin Durham and Margaret Power, eds., New Perspectives on the Transnational 
Right (London, 2010), 39–66, here 52–53. 
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nationalism.18 Yet there is no necessary contradiction between particularist nationalism 
and universalist cosmopolitanism. A cosmopolitanism that implicitly recognized 
differences between nations could also be embraced by the most ardent nationalists. 
Wartime Berlin’s anticolonial milieu was characterized by a reactionary 
cosmopolitanism, which served its members as a means to pursue their radical 
nationalist agendas. 
 The relationship between Berlin’s anticolonial revolutionaries and the regime 
was full of tensions. Whereas the Germans sought to use the exiles to destabilize their 
adversaries’ territories, the exiles sought practical assistance for their liberation 
struggles and official recognition of their legitimacy and their countries’ sovereignty. 
More generally, this history can widen our understanding of political exiles in modern 
history.19 Although historians have shown much interest in émigré communities, they 
                                                 
18 Glenda Sluga and Julia Horne, “Cosmopolitanism: Its Pasts and Practices,” Journal 
of World History 21, no. 3 (2010): 369–373, provides a brief historiographical and 
conceptual discussion. Bernhard Gißibl and Isabella Löhr, eds., Bessere Welten: 
Kosmopolitismus in den Geschichtswissenschaften (Frankfurt a.M., 2017), offers a 
more general overview and good case studies. Other important historical case studies 
are Nico Slate, Colored Cosmopolitanism: The Shared Struggle for Freedom in the 
United States and India (Cambridge, Mass., 2012); Seema Alavi, Muslim 
Cosmopolitanism in the Age of Empire (Cambridge, Mass., 2015); and the essays in 
Bose and Manjapra, Cosmopolitan Thought Zones. On the study of cosmopolitanism 
more generally, see the contributions in Pheng Cheah and Bruce Robbins, eds., 
Cosmopolitics: Thinking and Feeling beyond the Nation (Minneapolis, 1998); Carol A. 
Breckenridge, Sheldon Pollock, Homi K. Bhabha, and Dipesh Chakrabarty, eds., 
Cosmopolitanism (Durham, N.C., 2002); and Garrett Wallace Brown and David Held, 
eds., The Cosmopolitanism Reader (Cambridge, 2010). 
19 Yossi Shain, The Frontier of Loyalty: Political Exiles in the Age of the Nation-State 
(Middletown, Conn., 1989); and the essays in Shain, ed., Governments-in-Exile in 
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have given little attention to the geopolitics of political exiles. Yet the study of political 
émigré communities can provide insights into the history of geopolitical patronage 
relationships, illuminating the myriad mechanisms of great power exploitation of these 
groups as well as the exiles’ techniques of utilizing their protector states. It 
demonstrates that exile politicians can almost never be reduced to one role, as they 
were usually instruments of their patrons, intermediaries, and independent actors, with 
their own political interests and worldviews, at the same time. 
 
FOLLOWING GERMANY’S LOSS of its colonies at Versailles, German colonialist circles 
worked throughout the 1920s and 1930s for the restoration of the overseas empire, 
promoting their country as a “model colonizer,” a phenomenon that has been described 
as colonialism without colonies.20 Yet at the same time, the loss (and lack) of its 
colonies gave Germans on both the left and the right the opportunity to claim that they 
were interested in the liberation of colonized peoples. 
 The Nazi regime initially pursued no clear line in its policies toward the 
colonial world. Some factions—mainly the imperialist conservative circles around 
Hitler’s self-proclaimed chief colonialist, Franz Xaver Ritter von Epp—advocated 
                                                                                                                                             
Contemporary World Politics (New York, 1991); and, more generally, Paul Tabori, 
The Anatomy of Exile: A Semantic and Historical Study (London, 1972). 
20 Sebastian Conrad, German Colonialism: A Short History, trans. Sorcha O’Hagan 
(Cambridge, 2012), provides an overview of German colonial empire and its loss at 
Versailles. On colonialism without colonies after 1919, see Wolfe W. Schmokel, 
Dream of Empire: German Colonialism, 1919–1945 (New Haven, Conn., 1964). On 
the idea of the “model colonizer,” see Michelle R. Moyd, Violent Intermediaries: 
African Soldiers, Conquest, and Everyday Colonialism in German East Africa (Athens, 
Ohio, 2014), 8–9; and, for an excellent case study, “Conclusion: Making Askari 
Myths,” ibid., 207–212. 
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colonial expansion overseas and saw anticolonial movements as a threat to Europe’s 
imperial hegemony.21 On the other side, however, there had always been an 
anticolonial wing in the Nazi Party. The earliest group was the party’s so-called 
revolutionary “socialists,” centered around the Strasser brothers, Gregor and Otto, who 
advocated the right of national self-determination in the colonial world.22 Railing 
against the liberal, capitalist, and imperialist world order, the “Strasser group” 
proposed that Germany should lead an “alliance of the oppressed peoples” against the 
victors of Versailles.23 In the group’s “Fourteen Theses on the German Revolution” of 
1929, the suppression of “foreign peoples” was categorically rejected.24 
                                                 
21 Klaus Hildebrand, Vom Reich zum Weltreich: Hitler, NSDAP und die koloniale 
Frage, 1919–1945 (Munich, 1969); Alexandre Kum’a N’dumbe III, Was wollte Hitler 
in Afrika? NS-Planungen für eine faschistische Neugestaltung Afrikas (Frankfurt a.M., 
1993); Karten Linne, Deutschland jenseits des Äquators? Die NS-Kolonialplanungen 
für Afrika (Berlin, 2008); and Willeke Sandler, Empire in the Heimat: Colonialism and 
Public Culture in the Third Reich (Oxford, 2018). 
22 Reinhard Kühnl, Die nationalsozialistische Linke, 1925–1930 (Meisenheim, 1966), 
37–39, 108–126; Hildebrand, Vom Reich zum Weltreich, 237–247; and Klaus 
Hildebrand, The Foreign Policy of the Third Reich (London, 1973), 15–21. Some of 
these ideas may be traced back to 1919; see, for example, Arthur Moeller van den 
Bruck, Das Recht der jungen Völker (Munich, 1919). 
23 Gregor Strasser, “Nationale Außenpolitik! Der Bund der unterdrückten Völker (17. 
Juli 1925),” in Strasser, ed., Freiheit und Brot: Ausgewählte Reden und Schriften eines 
National-Sozialisten (Berlin, 1928), 43–48. Another example is Strasser, “Der deutsche 
Landsknecht als Kanonenfutter gegen Rußland,” Völkischer Beobachter, October 22, 
1925, which called for an alliance of the “oppressed peoples,” be they in India, China, 
or Egypt, against the “ring of the capitalist-imperialist world powers” and the 
“defenders of Versailles.” 
24 Otto Strasser, “14 Thesen der Deutschen Revolution,” Nationalsozialistische Briefe, 
August 1, 1929, 22–24. 
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 In the end, both of these movements remained marginal. Initially, the regime’s 
leadership did not care much about the colonial world. Hitler was interested in 
territories in Central and Eastern Europe, not overseas. In the non-European world, 
Berlin acknowledged the imperial interests of Italy, Spain, and, most importantly, 
Britain, which Hitler sought as allies. Moreover, in terms of ideology, colonial peoples 
were considered racially inferior, and thus could never be treated as equals, let alone 
partners. Their subjugation was justified as the natural result of Europe’s racial 
superiority. Hitler also made no secret of his deep admiration for the British Empire. 
“If the earth has an English world empire today,” he wrote in the late 1920s, “then 
there is also no people that would currently be more qualified for it.”25 On the other 
hand, he never hid his contempt for anticolonial nationalist movements. In Mein Kampf 
he wrote that the Egyptians, Indians, and others whom he had encountered in interwar 
Germany “had always struck me as garrulous posers, without any real substance,” and 
warned his comrades against entering discussions with “such bumptious Orientals” 
who “roved around in Europe.”26 In a speech to his commanding generals at the 
Obsersalzberg on August 22, 1939, he was even more frank: “Let us think as rulers and 
let us see in these peoples at best lacquered half-monkeys who want to feel the 
knout.”27 Even worse were his and the Nazi elites’ resentments against the peoples of 
Central Asia and the Caucasus, who were routinely dismissed as subhuman “Asiatics.” 
                                                 
25 Hitlers Zweites Buch: Ein Dokument aus dem Jahr 1928, ed. Gerhard L. Weinberg 
(Stuttgart, 1961), 165; translated into English as Hitler’s Second Book: The 
Unpublished Sequel to Mein Kampf, ed. Gerhard L. Weinberg, trans. Krista Smith 
(New York, 2003), 161–162, quote from 161. 
26 Adolf Hitler, Mein Kampf (Munich, 1939; first published 1925 and 1926), 757. 
27 Hitler, Speech to the Chief Commanders, August 22, 1939, Obersalzberg (“Zweite 
Ansprache des Führers am 22. August 1939”), in Akten zur Auswärtigen Politik 1918–
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 It was the course of the war that changed the situation. The quest for a strategic 
alliance with Britain failed. The British, French (Third Republic and, later, Free 
French), Dutch, and Belgian empires became adversaries. As the war reached its 
turning point in late 1941 and Berlin’s policies became more pragmatic, aimed at 
building broader alliances (as reflected, for instance, in its attempts to foster a 
European struggle against Bolshevism), several parts of the Nazi state began to make 
efforts to engage in anticolonial policies and to reach out to anticolonial movements. 
This was not, to be sure, a return to the old Strasser anti-imperialism, but rather the 
result of wartime pragmatism. 
 Various memoranda on the support of anticolonial nationalist movements had 
already been circulating since the beginning of the war. They were put forward by an 
older generation of officers who had been involved in similar policies during the First 
World War, most importantly Oskar von Niedermayer, now an officer in the 
Wehrmacht, and his rival, Werner Otto von Hentig, now at the Wilhelmstraße, both of 
whom had led missions to organize insurgents on the North-West Frontier against the 
British Empire between 1914 and 1916. While Niedermayer, in a memorandum of 
November 3, 1939, espoused backing “indigenous forces” in the imperial world, from 
the Arab lands to India, to destabilize London’s and Paris’s global empires, Hentig’s 
plan, drawn up around the same time, was less ambitious, advocating the support of 
nationalists in Afghanistan and northern India.28 Their former superior, the diplomat 
                                                                                                                                             
1945: Aus dem Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes, Series D: 1937–1945, vol. 7 (Baden-
Baden, 1961), 171–172 (Document 193), here 172. 
28 Niedermayer, Memorandum (“Politik und Kriegsführung im Vorderen Orient: Eine 
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German Foreign Office (Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amts), Berlin [hereafter 
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Max von Oppenheim—an architect of Germany’s revolutionary policies in the First 
World War, now retired in Berlin—submitted a similar memorandum to the Foreign 
Office after the fall of France on July 25, 1940, proposing that the regime should 
engage in anticolonial policies from North Africa to South Asia.29 These memoranda, 
however, were unshelved only when the military situation deteriorated—between late 
1941 and early 1942. 
 In fall 1941, a number of new memoranda on the colonial world were being 
produced in Berlin. The first of these were drawn up in the Foreign Office. The most 
important was a strategy paper about the organization and coordination of support for 
anticolonial movements in India, North Africa and the Middle East, and Central Asia, 
written on the orders of Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop by the head of the 
Foreign Office’s Political Department, Ernst Woermann, and Hentig on November 6, 
1941.30 It recommended massive coordinated support for anticolonial movements 
across the world, providing blueprints for the organization of anticolonial propaganda, 
cooperation with anticolonial leaders, the establishment of anticolonial councils, 
declarations of support for independence in the Arab world, India, and Central Asia, 
and even the mobilization of volunteers from these countries into the armed forces. 
The colonial world was conceptualized as a single geopolitical space, composed of 
different continents and ethnic groups. Ribbentrop presented the program to Hitler, 
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29 Oppenheim, Memorandum, July 25, 1940, Berlin, PA, Nachlass Hentig, vol. 84. 
30 Woermann, Memorandum (“Aufzeichnung über Fragen des Vorderen Orients”), 
November 6, 1941, Berlin, PA, R 28876 (also in R 261179); and, attached, Hentig, 
Memorandum (“Turanismus”), n.d., Berlin. 
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who was still undecided.31 Over the course of the year, many other more concrete and 
regionally focused policy papers were produced.32 A memorandum on the British 
Empire, for example, detailed practical steps for the support of nationalists from India 
to Ireland, from the Arab countries to South Africa.33 Eventually, beginning in late 
1941, with Hitler’s toleration, Berlin made increasing efforts to back anticolonial 
nationalists from Africa’s Atlantic to Asia’s Pacific. 
 This policy was initially organized by the Foreign Office, which was in charge 
of the non-European world and relations with anticolonial nationalists (one of the few 
areas in which it had not become irrelevant). It was coordinated by the officers of the 
                                                 
31 Ribbentrop, Internal Note (“Notiz für den Führer”), November 13, 1941, Train 
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Political Department, namely the Orient Section (Orientreferat) under Wilhelm 
Melchers, with veteran diplomats Fritz Grobba, Curt Prüfer, and Erwin Ettel; the India 
Section (Sonderreferat Indien), run by SS officer Wilhelm Keppler and his assistants 
Adam von Trott zu Solz and Karl Kapp; and the Soviet Union section 
(Russlandkommittee), with Hentig in charge of Central Asia. It is worth noting that 
many of these officers were older professional diplomats who had been involved in 
similar anti-imperial schemes in the First World War. As the war progressed, other 
parts of the regime adopted these anticolonial policies, most importantly the 
Wehrmacht, particularly its intelligence service, the East Ministry, with its Central 
Asia and Caucasus section (Abteilung Fremde Völker), and, toward the end of the war, 
the SS. Despite institutional rivalries and shifting competencies, their policies toward 
non-European national liberation movements were remarkably coherent. 
 In terms of its racism, the regime proved to be pragmatic.34 (Non-Jewish) 
Arabs, Iranians, and Turks had already been explicitly exempted from any institutional 
                                                 
34 On these debates of the 1930s, see the files entitled “Inclusion of Egyptians, Iraqis, 
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Rassenpolitik auf die Beziehungen zu fremden Staaten”), PA, R 99182. On the 
wartime pragmatism, see also Mühlen, Zwischen Hakenkreuz und Sowjetstern, 46–56, 
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racial discrimination in the mid-1930s, following diplomatic interventions from the 
governments in Cairo, Tehran, and Ankara. Similarly, Indians, as subjects of the 
English crown, were officially exempt from racial policies early on. During the war, 
the Germans showed similar pragmatism when working with Caucasian and Central 
Asian, as well as, though to a lesser extent, sub-Saharan African nationalists. The 
apparent contradictions of the regime’s racial policies, which at the same time led to 
the murder of millions, are indeed striking. In the end, with the exception of its 
antisemitism, the Nazi state proved to be increasingly flexible in its racial policies, 
showing that racisms in practice are often situational, contingent, even arbitrary. 
 The central pillar of the regime’s anticolonial policies was a massive pamphlet 
and shortwave radio propaganda campaign that was launched across the Global South, 
denouncing imperial rule and promoting an anti-liberal (non-Wilsonian) vision of 
national self-determination, nationalism, and ethnic sovereignty.35 In North Africa and 
the Middle East alone, the Germans distributed millions of anticolonial pamphlets and 
aired continuous broadcasts railing against empire. After Erwin Rommel’s tanks had 
crossed the Egyptian border in the summer of 1942, Radio Berlin declared that they 
would not only guarantee “Egypt’s independence and sovereignty,” but also “liberate” 
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the “whole of the Near East” from the “British yoke.”36 German propaganda in Arabic 
relentlessly promoted Germany as the champion of national liberation of the oppressed 
peoples. “[T]he domination of the tyrants,” it promised, would “not survive for very 
long.”37 In India, Radio Berlin, broadcasting in several South Asian languages, 
regularly called for national self-determination. At the height of the disturbances 
triggered by Mahatma Gandhi’s Quit India movement, it urged Indians to engage in a 
more uncompromising struggle against their colonial masters.38 Promises by the Allies 
were a hoax, it warned—Roosevelt’s Atlantic Charter was as devious as Wilson’s 
Fourteen Points had been. Although Berlin was more cautious with nationalist 
propaganda in Central Asia and the Caucasus, here too it routinely called for liberation 
from foreign rule; in late 1941, German propaganda in Azerbaijan went so far as to call 
for violent revolt: “Azerbaijanis! Arm yourselves with rifles and machine guns, form 
underground organizations!” “Fight for the liberation of your homeland and prove 
thereby your national spirit!”39 By the end of the war, Berlin had become a major 
global exporter of anti-imperial radicalism. Its propaganda reached millions, causing 
much anxiety among the Allies. George Orwell, who was involved in British wartime 
propaganda in the colonial world, noted the ruthless hypocrisy behind the Germans’ 
propaganda, which “with an utter unscrupulousness,” he wrote in his diary in spring 
1942, was “offering everything to everybody, freedom to India and a colonial empire 
                                                 
36 U.S. Legation Cairo, Broadcast Monitoring Script (“Berlin in Arabic”), July 3, 1942, 
U.S. National Archives, College Park, Maryland [hereafter USNA], Record Group 
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37 U.S. Legation Cairo, Broadcast Monitoring Script (“The Arab Nation”), January 4, 
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38 Trott to German Embassy Rome, August 3, 1942, Berlin, PA, RAV Rom Quirinal 
Geheim, vol. 165. 
39 Hentig, Internal Note, December 15, 1941, Berlin, PA, R 29900. 
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to Spain, emancipation to the Kaffirs and stricter race laws to the Boers.”40<FIG. 1 
NEAR HERE> 
 Moreover, Berlin forged alliances with anticolonial leaders. The most important 
among them were those in exile in the German capital. But the regime also fostered 
links with anticolonial revolutionaries outside of Germany. Future Egyptian president 
Anwar al-Sadat, for example, who during the war was a young radical member of the 
Free Officers, cooperated with German military intelligence in 1942, later explaining 
in his memoirs that “anything that weakened the British position” had been “of prime 
importance” to him.41 Habib Abu Raqiba (Bourguiba), who would become president of 
Tunisia, was freed from a Vichy prison in Lyon in late 1942 by the Germans, together 
with other Tunisian anticolonial leaders, and sent to Tunis via Rome, where he was 
welcomed like a head of state and resided at Respighi Palace.42 Although Bourguiba 
warmly thanked his liberators in a speech on an Axis broadcast, he remained on guard, 
and following the Allied occupation of Tunisia, he changed sides.43 Numerous Central 
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Asian nationalists who were exiled in Kabul, such as the prominent Uzbek dissident 
Said Mubashir Tarasi, worked with the German legation there.44 
 Even colonial prisoners of war were courted. Although, during the Battle of 
France, the Germans initially treated colonial soldiers particularly cruelly, massacring 
many, French colonial prisoners of war—numbering nearly 100,000—were soon 
wooed with better treatment and extra rations, and targeted by extensive anticolonial 
propaganda, which, unsurprisingly, raised the suspicions of the Vichy authorities.45 
One of the prisoners, Senegal’s later president Léopold Sédar Senghor, who was 
interned in camps in Poitiers and Saint-Médard (Bordeaux), reported after his release 
on the “well organized” German propaganda, which was aimed at North African 
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prisoners in particular, and apparently led to tensions between them and West African, 
Caribbean, and other captives.46 In late 1941, the Germans started releasing thousands 
of French colonial prisoners of war. Some went to Berlin to work with pro-Axis 
anticolonial nationalists there; others volunteered to fight against the Allies.<FIG. 2 
NEAR HERE> 
 In 1941, the Wehrmacht (and later the Waffen-SS) began mobilizing 
anticolonial volunteers into regular and irregular units: the Indian Legion, Azad Hind 
Fauj, which grew to more than 3,000 men during the war; the Arab Legion, which 
attracted around 1,000 volunteers; and, most importantly, the Eastern Legions of 
national minorities of Central Asia and the Caucasus, whose numbers swelled to 
almost 250,000 recruits.47 Even a unit of Irish nationalists was formed, albeit with less 
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success.48 And toward the end of the war, the regime also made attempts to mobilize 
sub-Saharan African volunteers.49 Most of these men were recruited in prisoner-of-war 
camps, but some were anticolonial exiles and radicalized students. They were told to 
liberate their home countries militarily, in both regular and commando operations. In 
practice, however, they were employed only as auxiliaries on the fronts of 
Europe.<FIGS. 3 AND 4 NEAR HERE> 
 Moreover, the Wehrmacht sent numerous military missions into the imperial 
hinterlands to organize local insurgencies. Such operations were organized in southern 
Iran between 1942 and 1944; in Iraq in 1941, where the German army backed the coup 
by Iraqi army officers to overthrow the pro-British government and install the pro-Axis 
politician Rashid ʿAli al-Kaylani as prime minister; in Palestine in 1944, where 
German soldiers and Arab fighters were parachuted in with a cargo of rifles, machine 
guns, and explosives designed for guerrilla warfare to organize local resistance and 
sabotage the imperial infrastructure; on the Raj’s North-West Frontier between 1941 
and 1942, where couriers from the German legation in Kabul sent arms and 
ammunition to the rebels of Mirza Ali Khan; and in the Caucasus, where several 
German military units were deployed between 1942 and 1944 to arm revolutionary 
autonomists.50 
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 To be sure, these policies had limits. Until the end, Berlin remained reluctant to 
interfere in regions considered to be spheres of interest of Fascist Italy, Vichy France, 
and Francoist Spain. And yet, Germany’s policies to undermine the European empires, 
involving almost all factions of the regime, were more forceful than scholars have 
generally acknowledged. They provided significant space for an international group of 
anticolonial radicals to organize their fight against empire from Nazi Berlin. 
 
THE OTHER SIDE OF this history—the stories of anticolonial nationalists who sided with 
Germany—is even more complex. Berlin’s wartime exile community was highly fluid 
and vastly heterogeneous, composed of revolutionaries with various backgrounds, 
motivations, and strategies. The militant Irish nationalist Seán Russell was one of the 
first anti-imperial revolutionaries to travel to Berlin, arriving in summer 1940. Many 
came at the height of the war, in 1941–1942, including well-known leaders such as 
Amin al-Husayni, who in 1937 had fled Jerusalem to Beirut and later Baghdad, 
eventually reaching Berlin in fall 1941; Rashid al-Kaylani, who escaped Iraq after the 
failed coup in April 1941 and arrived in the German capital a few weeks later; and 
Subhas Chandra Bose, the former leader of the Indian National Congress and one of 
Asia’s most radical anticolonial revolutionaries, who secretly escaped from Calcutta in 
                                                                                                                                             
see René Wildangel, Zwischen Achse und Mandatsmacht: Palästina und der 
Nationalsozialismus (Berlin, 2007), 350–357. On the missions in Ireland, see Enno 
Stephan, Spies in Ireland (London, 1963). On the missions on the North-West Frontier, 
see Milan Hauner, “One Man against the Empire: The Faqir of Ipi and the British in 
Central Asia on the Eve of and during the Second World War,” Journal of 
Contemporary History 16, no. 1 (1981): 183–212. On the missions in Central Asia and 
the Caucasus, see Mühlen, Zwischen Hakenkreuz und Sowjetstern, 166–182. 
 26 
early 1941 and arrived in Berlin via Kabul and Moscow in the spring. Some of them 
were accompanied by large entourages.51 
 Perhaps more importantly, there were scores of lesser-known anticolonial 
nationalists who made Germany their base during the war and rose to prominence in 
Berlin’s wartime anticolonial community. Most came from North Africa and the 
Middle East—figures such as the Syrian revolutionary Fawzi al-Qawuqji, who had 
fought against the European imperial presence across the Middle East, and who in the 
summer of 1941 was brought by plane from Aleppo via Athens to Berlin; the Iraqi 
nationalist and anticolonial radical Yunus Bahri, who moved from Baghdad to Berlin 
in the early years of the war; and the Egyptian nationalist (and distant cousin of King 
Farouk) Mansur Daoud, who in 1942, at the height of the battle for North Africa, fled 
from Cairo via Istanbul to Berlin. The group of South Asian anticolonial activists was 
slightly smaller—the most prominent among them was the Indian radical Arathil 
Chandeth Narayanan Nambiar, who had moved to Germany from France in spring 
1942. The community of Central Asian and Caucasian nationalists was large, and 
included figures such as the North Caucasian nationalist Ali Khan Kantemir, who had 
been a minister of the short-lived Republic of the North Caucasus in 1917–1919; the 
Azerbaijani nationalist Abbas Bey Atamalibekov, who had been a member of the 
Azerbaijani delegation at Versailles; and the Georgian nationalists Spiridon Kedia, Leo 
Keresselidse, and Zurab Avalishvili, all prominent leaders of the interwar years. Many 
                                                 
51 On al-Husayni, see Gensicke, The Mufti of Jerusalem and the Nazis. On al-Kaylani, 
see Renate Dieterich, “Rashid ʿAli al-Kailani in Berlin: Ein irakischer Nationalist in 
NS-Deutschland,” Al Rafidayn: Jahrbuch zu Geschichte und Kultur des modernen Iraq 
3 (1995): 47–79. On Bose, see Hayes, Subhas Chandra Bose in Nazi Germany; 
Kuhlmann, Netaji in Europe; and Bose, His Majesty’s Opponent, chap. 7. On Russell, 
see Carter, The Shamrock and the Swastika, chap. 9; and Wood, Britain, Ireland and 
the Second World War, 117–122. 
 27 
of them arrived in spring 1942, when the Foreign Office invited Central Asian and 
Caucasian exile nationalists from across Europe to a lavish congress at the Adlon 
Hotel; impressed by the warm welcome, they decided to stay.52 
 In Berlin they mingled with an older generation of anti-imperial exiles who had 
moved to Germany before the war, having turned Weimar Berlin into one of Europe’s 
great anticolonial metropolises.53 The Nazi takeover in 1933—which was followed by 
a crackdown on left-wing anticolonial groups, most importantly the International 
Secretariat of the League against Imperialism in Berlin—had been a serious blow to 
the community, and many had been arrested, had fled, or had been expelled. Still, a 
sizable group of non-communist anticolonial activists had remained, and some of them 
became prominent anticolonial leaders in wartime Berlin, among them colorful figures 
such as the Indian anticolonialist Habibur Rahman, who had moved to Germany in 
1923, where he became one of the Indian community’s most ardent supporters of 
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Nazism, writing for newspapers such as the Völkischer Beobachter; the Moroccan 
anticolonial leader Taqi al-Hilali, who had studied in Bonn before settling in Berlin in 
1939; and the Turkestani nationalist Veli Kajum, who had come to Berlin as a student 
from Bukhara in 1922.54<FIG. 5NEAR HERE> 
 While most of these leaders stayed in the German capital until the end of the 
war, some came only for brief stints, to sound out the regime’s support. Among them 
were prominent figures like Morocco’s nationalist leader (and later prime minister) 
Ahmad Balafrej, the Chechen rebel leader Said Shamil, and the Azerbaijani separatist 
(and former leader of the short-lived Azerbaijan People’s Republic) Amin 
Rasulzadeh.55 As Berlin became known as a sponsor of the global anticolonial 
struggle, revolutionaries from around the world visited to see what was on offer. 
 Many of these nationalists had similar backgrounds. Most had put their hopes 
in Wilsonianism after the First World War, but soon became disillusioned with liberal 
ideas. Turning away from liberalism, which seemed inseparably connected to empire, 
they had toyed with a number of different authoritarian ideologies in the interwar 
period, looking to Stalin’s Soviet Union, Mussolini’s Italy, and Hitler’s Germany for 
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inspiration and support. In fact, it was not unusual for interwar anticolonial nationalists 
and intellectuals to discuss, adopt, and merge different political ideas, ranging from 
authoritarian nationalism to cosmopolitan socialism. Revolutionaries like Bose, who in 
his book The Indian Struggle had called for a synthesis between communism and 
fascism, had been sympathetic to the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, which seemed to 
create a forceful offense against British, French, and Dutch colonial hegemony.56 
Nationalists from the Caucasus and Central Asia, on the other hand, who had 
welcomed Lenin’s courtship of national minorities and his anti-imperialism, had soon 
become disenchanted with communism and turned to the right, moving closer to more 
militant nationalism and right-wing authoritarianism. There were various forms of 
nationalism among the revolutionaries of wartime Berlin, most importantly, perhaps, 
ethnic nationalisms such as racial pan-Arabism and pan-Turanism. 
 It is also worth mentioning that most of them had lived remarkably 
cosmopolitan lives. In a world of heightened global connectivity, the experience of 
global displacement was part of their political struggle. Bose, for example, had moved 
between Britain, Ireland, Italy, Austria, Egypt, and India, mingling with political 
leaders from Mustafa al-Nahas Pasha to Mussolini. Al-Husayni had roamed the world 
in the interwar years, from London to Geneva to Mecca, before leaving Palestine for 
Lebanon and, later, Iraq. Most Central Asian and Caucasian nationalists had lived in 
exile communities in Europe and the Middle East between the wars. Al-Qawuqji had 
become a popular hero of international anti-imperialism, having fought against the 
French in the Syrian Revolt of 1925–1927, against the British in both the Palestine 
Revolt of 1936 and the Iraqi conflict of 1941, and against the 1941 Gaullist invasion of 
Syria, where he was severely wounded when British planes bombed his convoy near 
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Tadmur (Palmyra). Nambiar had lived in interwar Germany, where he was persecuted 
as a communist in 1933, and had moved between anticolonial exile communities in 
Prague, Zurich, London, Paris, and Marseilles. Taqi al-Hilali had roamed between 
Tangier, Alexandria, Basra, Mecca, and Calcutta. Yunus Bahri had worked as an 
anticolonial publicist in the Dutch East Indies and later settled in Iraq, where he 
published a newspaper and was employed as an announcer at the state broadcast 
station. The British felt quite uneasy about him, with a colonial intelligence report 
remarking: “Berlin could never have been able to find a better-suited man to be its 
propaganda instrument . . . He is a man famous for nothing more than his dirty tongue, 
intrigues and a first class inventor of lies and mischief maker and above all ready to be 
hired by anyone who pays a good price.”57 
 The motives of these men varied. Ideologically, Nazi Germany appealed to 
them because it offered an alternative to the liberal imperial world order, unchained 
from the Versailles settlement. Many also were attracted by the regime’s revolutionary 
nature, its anti-liberal nationalism, and its authoritarian vision of modernity. Moreover, 
pragmatically it constituted a powerful ally against their imperial oppressors. And the 
initial military victories further boosted Germany’s prestige. For a time, as the Axis 
armies overran Batavia, Singapore, and Rangoon and advanced toward Cairo, Baku, 
and Calcutta, it seemed that the Axis would determine the future world order. Indeed, 
for some of the more opportunistic anticolonial leaders, it was pragmatic strategic 
considerations—Germany’s military and technical might and its hostility toward their 
colonial masters—rather than ideological commitment that drove them to Berlin. Yet 
the motives behind cooperation were often complex and cannot be reduced to a binary 
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distinction between pragmatism and ideology. Many who turned to the Germans had a 
variety of overlapping reasons for doing so, and these reasons could change over time. 
 In Germany, most of these leaders had considerable agency. Berlin’s increasing 
efforts to side with anticolonial nationalists (and the rivalries between different 
branches of the regime) created spaces within which the revolutionaries could pursue 
their own interests. Once their institutions—committees, publications, and 
congresses—were established, they developed their own inner life, which was often 
difficult to control. 
 Almost all of these groups organized themselves into national committees.58 
The Indians created the Free India Committee, which was headed initially by Subhas 
Chandra Bose and then, after his departure from Germany, by Nambiar, with its 
headquarters, the Free India Center or Azad Hind Sangh (Zentrale Freies Indien), 
located in the heart of Berlin, near Tiergarten. The Arabs founded several smaller 
groups. The national committees of revolutionaries from Central Asia and the 
Caucasus, established between summer 1942 and spring 1943, included the National 
Turkestani Unity Committee (Nationalturkestanisches Einheitskomitee) and the Volga 
Tatar Fighting League (Kampfbund der Turktataren Idel-Urals). Less successful were 
the committees of Georgians, Armenians, Azerbaijanis, and nationalists from the North 
Caucasus, as the Germans had not decided upon the status of those territories in the 
future New Order. Many of the committees were autocratically organized. The most 
extreme example, perhaps, was the National Turkestani Unity Committee, or Milli 
Türkistan Birlik Komitasi, as its members called it, which was dictatorially led by 
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strongman Veli Kajum through an authoritarian presidential system. Similarly, Azad 
Hind was strictly hierarchical, headed by Bose as its all-powerful “leader” (Netaji). For 
the exiles, the committees had two functions. First, they were to organize the national 
liberation of their respective countries. Their members would plan the political order of 
their future states, right down to the details of their symbols of sovereignty such as 
anthems, flags, and medals. Second, they were to represent their cause collectively, in 
contact with the German authorities. Many considered the committees governments in 
exile. The Nazi regime, for its part, used them to organize and control the exile 
communities. 
 Berlin’s anticolonial revolutionaries organized a number of major congresses to 
debate their struggle against empire. On November 2, 1943, on the twenty-sixth 
anniversary of the Balfour Declaration, Arab nationalists assembled at a major 
gathering at the Haus der Flieger in the heart of Berlin to denounce British 
imperialism, with speeches by al-Husayni, al-Kaylani, and Daoud. The event was 
attended by numerous German officials. Himmler sent a telegram affirming his 
support. The congress brought together anticolonial activists from across the world, 
including Central Asian nationalists such as Kajum. An SS officer later explained that 
the gathering had integrated “representatives of the various committees” to give 
“declarations of sympathy.”59 The Völkischer Beobachter praised it as a “powerful 
demonstration” against “the British-American-Jewish policy of suppression and 
exploitation.”60<FIG. 6 NEAR HERE> 
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 The Indian exiles had organized a similar commemorative congress a few 
months earlier at Berlin’s grand Hotel Kaiserhof on the occasion of the anniversary of 
the 1919 Amritsar Massacre (Jallianwallah Bagh Day). A speech by Bose, who had left 
Berlin a few weeks earlier for Tokyo, was read out denouncing the betrayal of 
Versailles.61 An even bigger Indian anti-imperial congress, with no fewer than six 
hundred guests, was held in Berlin on January 26, 1943, marking the anniversary of the 
Indian National Congress’s declaration of Indian independence in 1930. It was a 
spectacle, both visual and aural, of Indian sovereignty. The hall was decorated with 
flowers in the national colors—orange tulips and white lilacs—and national flags. The 
Indian national anthem was sung. Dressed in a black sherwani, Bose gave a passionate 
speech, denouncing “British imperialism” as “a cunning and diabolical enemy.” His 
address was replete with references to the global anticolonial struggle, to India, Burma, 
Palestine, and Iran: “The war offers not only India, but also all other enslaved nations 
of the British Empire a unique opportunity for throwing off the foreign yoke.”62 
Among the guests were German officials, foreign diplomats, and non-Indian 
anticolonial leaders, such as al-Husayni and al-Kaylani. Under Nambiar, a similar, 
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though more militaristic, congress was organized in fall 1943, on the occasion of the 
foundation of a provisional Indian national government. It included a procession by a 
uniformed delegation of Azad Hind soldiers. In a martial speech, Nambiar declared 
that the time for compromise was over and the final phase of the liberation struggle had 
begun. On its front page, the Völkischer Beobachter celebrated an “emotive and 
passionate denouncement” of British imperial oppression.63<FIGS. 7 AND 8 NEAR 
HERE> 
 The congresses organized by the nationalists from the Caucasus and Central 
Asia were very similar in nature. The Azerbaijani committee held a “national 
congress” at the Hotel Kaiserhof from November 6 to 9, 1943, with many speeches and 
receptions.64 The Berliner Börsenzeitung reported that, as in the tsarist era, the 
Azerbaijanis were fighting for their “national life,” being now part of the Axis’s 
“peoples’ front” (Völkerfront).65 Similarly lavish was the congress of the Volga Tatars 
(Qurultay, literally “meeting of the tribes”) from March 4 to 5, 1944, in Greifswald, 
where two hundred delegates engaged in political debates about the war and future 
independence. The biggest and most opulent national congress was organized by 
Kajum’s Turkestani committee and held from June 8 to 10, 1944, in Vienna. It 
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included not only political debates and declarations, but also readings of national 
poetry, gala dinners, and visits to the opera. Hitler cabled his congratulations to an 
ecstatic Kajum, who excitedly wrote to Himmler about his appreciation of the “Führer 
telegram,” which had “enhanced” the participants’ “fighting spirit.”66 These 
congresses, too, were attended by regime officials, as well as by other anticolonial 
leaders in Berlin, from Amin al-Husayni to Yunus Bahri. 
 Overall, the congresses became major displays of national sovereignty, with 
national flags and emblems thoroughly integrated into their overall composition. 
Usually carefully staged, they elevated the status of the exiles and their committees and 
allowed them to articulate their national aspirations and further their political agendas. 
Most of these congresses involved anticolonial leaders from a range of different 
countries, fostering a distinct anticolonial internationalism. Bahri, who in late 1941 
attended a conference organized by Caucasian and Central Asian nationalists, would 
later quote in his memoirs the entire text of their declaration of liberation, which had 
been announced at the meeting. It concluded with an appeal to Hitler: “We are 
confident that you will give full support to our efforts, until it becomes clearly manifest 
that you are working for the liberation of the oppressed.”67 In fall 1942, Habibur 
Rahman even organized an anticolonial solidarity conference at the Haus der Flieger—
as the Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung put it, it was “an impressive and solemn 
declaration of sympathy with the liberation struggle of the Arabs and Indians.”68 The 
room was packed with anticolonial nationalists and Axis functionaries. From the 
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podium, al-Kaylani outlined the global anti-imperial struggle, from the Arab world to 
Iran to India. “Today India has the opportunity,” he announced, “to throw off the 
shackles of serfdom,” and he expressed full solidarity with India’s “fight” for 
“freedom, independence, and sovereignty.” In response, Bose wished the “Arab 
nation” all “success” in its “liberation struggle”: “Long live the free Arab nation! Long 
live the Tripartite Powers and their allies! Long live the free India!”69 
 Most anticolonial nationalist groups published their own newspapers, creating 
intellectual space for debates about their struggles. These publications functioned as 
both exile and propaganda papers.70 The list included the Arab paper Barid al-Sharq 
(Orient Post), the Indian paper Azad Hind (Free India), and various Central Asian and 
Caucasian papers, such as Milli Türkistan (National Turkestan), Idel-Ural (Volga-
Ural), and Severnyj Kavkaz (North Caucasus), all published on the regime’s printing 
presses.71 One of the most prolific political exile writers, Abdurakhman Avtorkhanov, 
a Chechen dissident who had gone over to the Germans when they reached the 
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Caucasus in 1942 and who wrote for many different exile publications, recalled in his 
memoirs his constant fear of Moscow’s potential postwar revenge, noting that he 
“published all articles under a pseudonym,” and “never signed two articles published in 
a row with the same pseudonym.”72 The papers usually appeared in the nationalists’ 
native language, but some of them were multilingual. Their discourses were similar, 
drawing on anti-liberalism, anticolonialism, anti-communism, and at times 
antisemitism, while at the same time praising the Axis’s new global order. Articles 
were replete with words like “independence,” “sovereignty,” and “liberation.” Their 
content often not only dealt with the respective national question, but also 
demonstrated internationalist solidarities. Even Azad Hind, the most nationalist, 
inward-looking of all these papers, once proclaimed: “India of tomorrow, by the very 
logic of things, will be a strong partisan of international co-operation and justice for all 
nations big or small.”73 
 Eventually, Berlin’s anticolonial nationalists became directly involved in the 
organization of the volunteer legions. In their eyes, these units had two functions. First, 
they were conceived as national liberation armies that would free their home countries 
from foreign rule. Second, they were to aid the German war effort, in the hope that 
Berlin would, in return, support their future independence. Both anticolonial leaders 
and German officials were at pains to stress that they were autonomous, not mercenary 
armies. Their soldiers swore their oath under their new national flags and were 
subjected to radical nationalist and anti-imperial propaganda.74 In the eyes of the 
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Arabs, for example, their unit was not a regular Wehrmacht contingent, but an “Arab 
Liberation Army” (al-mafraza al-ʿarabiyya al-hurra). Al-Husayni later explained that 
its main aim was “the liberation of the Arab countries.”75 Al-Qawuqji compared it to 
Sharif Husayn’s army, which had fought alongside the British in the First World War. 
He understood it as the “nucleus of the future army” of an independent Levant.76 The 
Tatar nationalist leader Ahmet Temir, who had been a student in interwar Germany, 
and who during the war became involved in the recruitment of Tatar nationalists, 
regarded the Tatars’ units as part of the “national affairs” of the Tatars.77 And an 
Indian commander of Azad Hind saw in his unit the basis of a future national army.78 
 
TO SOME EXTENT, THE anticolonial activists in Berlin formed a community. Their 
committee meetings, congresses, and informal gatherings in cafés, canteens, and 
private houses created spaces for sociability. These spaces were nationalist, 
anticolonial, often bourgeois, and above all homosocial. In his memoirs, Yunus Bahri 
gives some fascinating insights into this milieu, writing that he often went to the grand 
Café Kranzler on Kurfürstendamm, where he would meet with “a number of Arab 
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brothers [who] would frequent this café every afternoon”: “We would hang out and 
discuss the latest developments in Germany and Europe” and “all kinds of matters in 
the Arab world” and share “anecdotes on the National Socialist Party [Hizb al-Irtikhaʾ 
al-Watani].”79 Anticolonial nationalists also met regularly in private locations. Al-
Qawuqji’s Berlin apartment, for example, became a hub for gatherings of Arab 
nationalists throughout the war.80 Remembering one of those evenings, Bahri later 
revealed: “We ate, drank, and laughed as if we were not at war at all!”81 Munir al-
Rayyis, a Syrian nationalist who had fought with al-Qawuqji in several anticolonial 
battles across the Middle East, fondly remembered an “evening party” at al-Qawuqji’s 
apartment “that lasted until the next morning.”82 For the Tatar nationalists, the house of 
a certain Abdurrahman Şafi Almas became a political center. “Especially during the 
war years, nearly every Saturday afternoon, I would be their guest and stay with them 
until the middle of the night,” Temir recounted.83 “Yet, nearly every time I went, I 
would encounter some other guests. It was as if this lively house were an office of the 
consulate for Tatars—never lacking visitors.” Nazi Berlin became a “contact zone” for 
anticolonial nationalists, to use Mary Louise Pratt’s words—a “space in which peoples 
geographically and historically separated come into contact with each other.”84 
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 Often these meetings (much like the congresses) brought together nationalists 
from across the colonized world, forging a cosmopolitan, non-European nationalist 
international. Al-Husayni later recalled the visits he received from “Arab, Muslim, and 
Eastern dignitaries who were resident in Germany at the time,” adding: “Among them 
was Siddiq Khan, the former Afghan foreign minister, the famous Indian leader Subhas 
Chandra Bose, a number of leaders from Azerbaijan and the Caucasus, as well as other 
leaders of the Muslims of Russia.”85 Temir spoke of an “atmosphere of intimate 
friendliness [samimi bir arkadaşlık] and amicability [dostluk]” among the Eastern 
nationalists. “Everyone looked to this war as a sacred [kutsal] war that would bring 
liberation to their nations.”86 Abdurakhman Avtorkhanov compared Berlin’s 
heterogeneous global exile community to Noah’s “biblical ark [bibleĭskom 
kovchege].”87 
 This internationalism was reflected not only in social practices—gatherings and 
congresses—but also in the émigrés’ self-perceptions and worldviews. Their writings 
show a remarkable degree of anti-imperial solidarity, with Amin al-Husayni praising 
the Axis-sponsored wartime “progress of Indonesia toward independence,” Munir al-
Rayyis celebrating the nationalities of the Soviet Union and their “revolt against 
Russian colonialism,” and Yunus Bahri admiring the “independence movements that 
had been operating secretly in Muslim Turkestan, the Urals, and the Crimean 
Peninsula,” which had “headed toward the Führer Hitler,” whom they saw as a “savior 
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who had descended from the heavens to aid their liberation and the elimination of the 
fog of communist imperialism.”88 
 In a memorandum sent to the Germans in spring 1941, Bose described India’s 
struggle as part of a global movement, expressing solidarity with the independence 
struggles in “Ireland, South Africa, India, Palestine, Egypt, Iraq” and claiming that “the 
heterogeneous British Empire” was “the one outstanding obstacle” for the world’s 
“New Order” and had “to be broken up completely.”89 In a subsequent memorandum, 
he spoke of an anti-imperial “moment” that would allow the Axis to “capture the 
imagination” of the oppressed from the Middle East to South Asia.90 Similarly, in his 
speeches to his followers, he would routinely refer to the internationalist character of 
his fight, portraying it as part of a global anti-imperial revolt against the order of 1919: 
“In the present world struggle one group of nations is trying to maintain the power it 
achieved as a sequel to the Versailles Treaty. The other group of nations is fighting 
with an iron will to eradicate the unhappy state of affairs looming large in the world 
and to establish a ‘New Order.’”91 “Let us rejoice that the old order which was set up at 
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Versailles is crashing before our very eyes.”92 At the same time, he warned of the 
Allies’ wartime “promises” of postwar national self-determination, recalling the 
betrayal of 1919: “Have we forgotten what happened to President Wilson’s Fourteen 
Points?”93 The oppressed would not be tricked again: “The Atlantic Charter, of which 
we have heard so much, is as much a scrap of paper as President Wilson’s Fourteen 
Points in the last war.”94 
In similarly general terms, Kajum described his Central Asian national 
movement as part of a global anti-imperial liberation struggle, merging notions of 
youth, the new man, anti-liberalism, anti-imperialism, and internationalist solidarity: 
“Today, the world is split into two parts. On one side stand the villains who want to 
exterminate the freedom-loving peoples; grouped on the other side are the young 
nations who, with their youthful dynamic strength and their will, confront these old 
nations, these liberalists. The future belongs to the youth and the young nations; 
because they want to live and have to live, so they will live and sweep away the old 
liberalist capitalists.” The struggle had already been decided, and the “days” of the 
“imperialist-colonialist and outdated” powers were “numbered.”95 
 This transnational chorus of anticolonial solidarity was an expression of the 
nationalists’ particular situation. In Germany, they mingled, liaised, and engaged with 
each other. Remapping their political geography, their exile provoked self-reflection on 
their own position in the global anticolonial struggle. It made the activists 
reconceptualize their own movements as part of the global revolt against empire. The 
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reasons for their cooperation were both idealistic—an ethos of solidarity—and 
pragmatic—the convenience of alliances that allowed them to speak collectively and 
pursue their political aims more forcefully. 
 The community also reached beyond the Reich, connecting anticolonial 
nationalists across the Axis world. The wartime life of these activists was marked by 
mobility, supported by German financial resources, and facilitated by modern means of 
transport, enabling, for instance, Kajum to go to Paris by train, al-Husayni to fly to 
Italy to meet anticolonial leaders in Rome, and Bose to move to Tokyo by submarine 
to organize his struggle from Asia. Some of the major anti-imperial metropolises of the 
interwar years—Paris, Rome, Brussels, Amsterdam—were now under Axis control. 
While the Germans suppressed numerous anticolonial activists across occupied 
Europe, especially communist groups, everywhere they found nationalists eager to 
cooperate. 
 In 1942, al-Qawuqji and some of his comrades went to Paris, where they stayed 
at the luxurious Bristol Hotel on the Champs-Élysées, met with anticolonial leaders 
and German officials for lunches and dinners at the Ritz, the Carlton, and La Nouvelle 
Europe restaurant, and enjoyed long evenings at cabarets, the Lido nightclub, and the 
cafés of Saint-Michel. At a meeting at the Hôtel Claridge, organized by Arab 
nationalists and attended by German officials, they gave anticolonial speeches and read 
poems on the “struggle of the Syrian people” and “their revolutions,” as al-Rayyis later 
put it; for him, it seemed like the ultimate triumph: “Paris was our focal point! It was a 
celebration to take revenge on France in the heart of Paris and in one of its great hotels, 
attended by hundreds of Arabs and foreigners, without France being able to prevent 
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it!”96 Kajum visited Paris in early 1942 to mingle with revolutionary exiles there in an 
attempt to convince some of them to come to Berlin.97 Bose, too, moved between 
Europe’s metropolises, meeting anticolonial revolutionaries in Rome, Paris, and 
Brussels.98 Al-Husayni later described at length his “numerous discussions” with North 
African nationalists—such as the “heroic leaders of Libya” around Emir Sulayman al-
Qaramanali, Mahmud al-Muntasir (the future prime minister), and Wahbi al-Buri (the 
future foreign minister)—as well as “Palestinians, Egyptians, Iraqis, and others,” who 
were all “rejoicing at the victories of Marshal Rommel” and “the defeats of the British” 
during a visit to Rome in 1942.99 By moving around, they not only fostered a 
transnational anticolonial network, but also created the idea of an international 
anticolonial underground. The network of anti-imperial nationalists cut across Axis 
Europe, and also reached into neutral countries, from Switzerland to Turkey. 
 It was the movement not just of people but also of ideas that connected 
anticolonial revolutionaries in Berlin with those beyond German borders. Their 
writings were circulated through the Axis global postal and publishing networks. Many 
engaged in international correspondences that connected them to places as far away as 
French West Africa and the Dutch East Indies. Others would write, as long as they 
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could, for publications outside of Germany.100 Anticolonial nationalists from across the 
world, in turn, published articles in Germany’s anticolonial press, creating a global 
intellectual-political public under Axis patronage. The Syrian pan-Arab nationalist 
Shakib Arslan published in Barid al-Sharq, for instance, and a Tatar exile in Paris had 
his thoughts printed in Milli Türkistan. They also used modern means of 
communication, such as the telegraph and the radio, to communicate globally. Bose, 
for example, cabled a message to Japan’s pan-Asian Bangkok Conference on June 15, 
1942.101 He also frequently used the radio to speak to his followers in South Asia, 
routinely ending his messages with the battle cry “Long Live the Revolution! Long 
Live Free India!” (Inquilab Zindabad! Azad Hind Zindabad!).102 
 
EVEN MORE IMPORTANT THAN the nationalists’ relations with each other were those 
with the regime. They cultivated their relationships with various German institutions, 
competing for official support. Anticolonial leaders bombarded the Germans with 
memoranda and petitions. Most interacted with officials of the regime on a daily basis. 
Many worked for its institutions and were involved in its policies in the colonial world. 
Some of the most prominent anticolonial leaders would even engage directly with the 
Nazi elite. Bahri met with Goebbels; Bose, al-Kaylani, and al-Husayni with Hitler, 
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Himmler, and Ribbentrop; and Kajum with Rosenberg, their communication enabled 
through translators. Often these meetings were propagandistically staged, planned in 
the minutest detail, with Wochenschau (newsreel) camera teams and propaganda 
photographers present. Such spectacles gave legitimacy to the exile politicians and 
their quest for self-determination. 
 At times the relations between the state and the exiles were marked by the 
nationalists’ attempts to align themselves with the regime’s ideology. While most of 
these adaptations were an expression of genuine ideological conviction, others were 
functional, aimed at achieving concessions. Emphasizing the revolutionary nature of 
their movements, Bose greeted Hitler as the “old revolutionary” in the hope that he 
would show more solidarity with India’s liberation struggle.103 Al-Husayni emphasized 
his hatred of “international Jewry and the colonialist countries,” which, he told Hitler, 
was their “strongest bond.”104 He never left any doubt that his future independent state 
would be ethnically cleansed of the Jewish population. The Caucasian revolutionary 
Ali Khan Kantemir explained (correctly) to the Germans that he and his comrades had 
always confronted “international democracy” and sympathized with Hitler’s Germany, 
Mussolini’s Italy, Franco’s Spain, and the new Japan: “National Socialism and Fascism 
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are the powerful means which alone can save the world from anarchy and civil war.”105 
Kajum, who publicly revered Hitler as the “leader of the freedom-loving peoples,” 
advocated the merging of nationalism, socialism, and traditionalism.106 In their 
interactions with regime officials, the exiles proved remarkably capable of relating to 
the regime’s ideology (as they perceived it) to give intellectual meaning to their 
cooperation. Just as anticolonial nationalists in interwar Paris embraced the ideals of 
the revolution when reaching out to state and society, as we know from the work of 
Michael Goebel, those in wartime Berlin at times adopted the regime’s ideology and 
political language.107 
 And yet, the ideological relations were anything but straightforward. This 
became most obvious in Bose’s engagement with the Nazi regime. Bose had a 
weakness for autocratic policies, militarism, and radical nationalism. In a key article on 
the future India, published in 1942, he announced that all “anti-national and disruptive 
elements” were to be “firmly suppressed.” “An adequate police force will have to be 
organised for this purpose and the law will have to be amended, so that offences 
against national unity may be punished heavily.” National education was to imbue the 
youth with “the spirit of national unity.”108 He also envisioned welfare and labor 
institutions modeled after the Nazi Arbeitsdienst (Labor Service), Winterhilfe (“Winter 
Relief” initiative), and Kraft durch Freude (Strength through Joy, the regime’s leisure 
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organization). At one point, Bose even asked Himmler if the SS would assist his new 
India in the building of a secret police, patterned after the Gestapo.109 At the same 
time, however, he was perhaps the most critical of the Nazi regime’s ideology of all the 
exiles, and he never tired of emphasizing in his speeches that cooperation with the Axis 
would not mean accepting its ideologies. Bose even confronted Hitler directly about 
his negative remarks about Indians in Mein Kampf. Unimpressed, Hitler replied that, 
first, he had thought it wrong that “the subject nations were supposed to build up a 
unified front against the oppressors” given the “weakness of these nations,” and, 
second, that he had not wanted to resort to “passive resistance for the Reich of the 
Indian pattern.”110 
 To be sure, the Germans were always in control, defining the framework of the 
relations. Exile politicians are by the nature of their situation tools of their foreign 
protectors. They require an apparatus to finance them and allow them to operate 
politically. Trapped in an asymmetric power relationship, the anticolonial nationalists 
were dependent on the regime and its resources and had to navigate its complex 
mechanics of power. On the one side, the Germans provided them with the room and 
resources to organize their struggle. In fact, the regime often granted their leaders a 
wide range of privileges, for instance providing Kajum with a diplomatic passport, a 
limousine, and a Berlin residence; al-Qawuqji with an apartment in the bourgeois 
Hansviertel and a car and driver; al-Husayni with several residences for himself and his 
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entourage, including a stately villa in Berlin-Zehlendorf; and Bose with a Berlin-
Charlottenburg mansion.111 They were all paid substantial monthly salaries. Living a 
life of luxury that would have been unthinkable for ordinary Germans during the war 
years, they frequented Europe’s most expensive hotels, restaurants, and cafés. Even the 
less prominent activists enjoyed generous privileges. 
 On the other side, the regime strictly controlled their activities and set firm 
boundaries. “We were at the mercy of the leaders,” al-Rayyis later dryly remarked.112 
They were subject to repressive acts, such as censorship, surveillance, and even 
detention. Their phones were tapped.113 Their movements could be restricted at any 
time. Their finances could be cut off; when Bose returned from a visit to Rome with 
suits from the city’s best tailors and costly furniture for his villa, his Foreign Office 
handler humiliatingly questioned this expense.114 They were dependent on resident 
permits, travel documents, and censorship permissions. The Germans provided the 
political platform, but dictated the terms and set the limits. 
 This became most obvious in the struggles over a German public declaration 
supporting national independence in the Global South. Throughout the war, the regime 
issued only vague or secret proclamations of postwar independence. Attempts by 
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anticolonial leaders and German diplomats to push for stronger public declarations 
were rejected by Hitler on the pretext that such announcements would become 
necessary only once German troops had reached these non-European regions and could 
support them militarily. The anticolonial activists submitted countless memoranda 
pushing for strong independence declarations, and they regularly brought up the issue 
in their meetings with regime functionaries. Only toward the end of the war did Berlin 
issue open and official declarations recognizing the independence of the peoples of the 
Arab world, India, and Central Asia.115 Overall, however, these disputes should still be 
considered with caution. In practice, the regime engaged closely with liberation 
movements from North Africa to South Asia, and its propaganda in Arabic, Hindi, 
Turkic, and other languages routinely endorsed anticolonial independence. Moreover, 
the Nazi state provided significant room for anticolonial activists to turn the capital 
into a hub of the global revolt against empire. Their activities—their national 
publications, committees, congresses, and militias (with all the symbolism, from flags 
to anthems)—gave unambiguous expression to their countries’ national sovereignty, 
even in the absence of any formal German declarations. 
 Of course, there were many other obstacles. Anticolonial nationalists in Nazi 
Germany struggled with linguistic difficulties. Most of them suffered under everyday 
racial discrimination and the violent substance of Nazi politics more generally.116 Bose 
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frequently complained about Nazi racism. Nationalists from Central Asia in particular 
endured harassment and humiliation in the Reich. Mustafa Çokay, the former leader of 
the short-lived Turkestan Republic, who had been in exile in interwar Paris, was 
physically attacked by a Nazi thug on the street in Berlin, prompting the regime to 
issue a formal apology. “Yellow ant tribes are being absorbed,” Ernst Jünger remarked 
in his diary about Central Asian war volunteers—in his words, “Mongols in German 
uniforms”—whom he encountered in the Paris metro in 1944, articulating widespread 
German racism against the new allies.117 Undoubtedly, the racism that anticolonial 
nationalists encountered tainted their views of the German regime. The general 
wartime hardship, too, became a burden. The exiles were trapped in a “total war” that 
“brutalized German society,” as Peter Fritzsche put it, a war in which “air raids 
bludgeoned civilians and destroyed their homes, while Nazi authorities enforced 
ruthless discipline.”118 Al-Husayni later recalled that he and his comrades continually 
“sensed the state of war that prevailed in the lands of the German Reich, which could 
be felt in the streets and markets”—“in private houses and in the public places, and 
everywhere, city or countryside.”119 Remembering the “tragedy of defeat,” al-Qawuqji 
described a country in which the “German people” had “suddenly turned into a semi-
nomadic people, living in filthy, wet, dark shelters,” suffering from “cold and 
starvation”: “With the German retreat on all fronts, our negotiations have been less 
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active, and we have lost hope of achieving what we hoped for.”120 As German efforts 
to mobilize anticolonial nationalists became more aggressive in 1943 and 1944, the 
exiles, with the Allies advancing and tightening their control over their colonies, 
became increasingly disillusioned, trapped in a situation they had not foreseen. 
 Most of the anticolonial leaders survived the war, and many continued their 
struggle against empire. Among the most prominent were al-Husayni and al-Qawuqji, 
both of whom played leading roles in the 1948 Arab-Israeli war.121 Al-Kaylani worked 
as an advisor to the Saudi king.122 Some anti-imperial figures who had been in contact 
with Berlin went on to become leaders of their postcolonial nation-states—Habib 
Bourguiba of Tunisia, Ahmad Balafrej of Morocco, Anwar al-Sadat of Egypt. Killed in 
a plane crash over Taiwan in 1945, Subhas Chandra Bose became an icon of the 
anticolonial revolt in postcolonial India. The Central Asian nationalists, in contrast, 
often descended into the political insignificance of postwar exile lives in Europe and 
America. Strikingly, many would continue to champion the idea of anticolonial (and 
later “Third World”) solidarity—and some would meet again a decade later, in 1955 in 
Bandung.123 
 The broader impact of the authoritarian moment on nationalist movements in 
the colonial world can hardly be overstated. In the postwar years, many of the 
anticolonial authoritarian nationalist movements that had emerged in the 1930s and 
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1940s, taking inspiration from Fascism and Nazism—from the Baʿthists in the Middle 
East to the National Patriots in South Asia—shaped the politics of postcolonial states. 
 
ALTHOUGH THE REGIME’S LEADERSHIP was often halfhearted in its support for 
anticolonial nationalists, in practice various branches of the Nazi state increasingly 
adopted anticolonial policies, giving anticolonial revolutionaries who were willing to 
cooperate remarkable space and means to organize their struggle. At the height of the 
war, Berlin became a hub of revolutionary anticolonialism in the global war against the 
liberal imperial world order. The cooperation between the regime and anticolonial 
radicals was messy and uneven, marked by contingencies, and faced many obstacles—
and yet it was far more extensive than most scholars have acknowledged. It is one of 
the incongruities of the Nazi regime that at a time when it murdered peoples deemed 
racially inferior across Europe, its capital became a place where non-European men 
could make pleas for freedom. 
 Historians have tended to see Nazi Germany as an imperial, rather than an anti-
imperial, state. In many respects, this view can be traced back to Hannah Arendt’s 
Origins of Totalitarianism, published in 1951.124 More recent research has revived this 
line of thought, looking at continuities from the imperial period as well as connections 
to (and emulation of) other contemporary empires.125 The history of Berlin’s 
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anticolonial revolutionaries, to some extent, challenges this paradigm. It reveals the 
Nazi regime as an enemy of empire, a revolutionary anticolonial force, a champion of 
an international order based on the principles of the nation, not empire, and therefore, 
despite its ruthlessness and brutality, as appealing to (and cooperating with) some 
anticolonial nationalists. 
 Moreover, the story of the anti-imperial nationalists’ evolving relations with the 
Nazi regime adds an important chapter to the entangled histories of the twentieth-
century struggle for anticolonial emancipation in Africa, the Middle East, and Asia. It 
illuminates the paths of anticolonialists who in the 1930s and 1940s turned to the rising 
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authoritarian nationalist regimes, be it for pragmatic or ideological reasons, or both. 
Their histories thereby also shed new light on the phenomenon of authoritarian 
nationalist anticolonialism in the world’s age of extremes. Above all, it illustrates that 
anticolonialism—its practices and worldviews—was always shaped by the global 
political conditions, and this also applies to its liberal and socialist variants. 
 Building bonds across ethnic, national, and imperial boundaries, even the most 
ardent nationalists among Berlin’s anticolonial exiles became part of an international 
against empire. We have tended to idealize the histories of cosmopolitan globetrotters, 
but we should not forget the darker side of twentieth-century internationalism—
reactionary cosmopolitanism and global cooperation of radical nationalists. Global 
history, at times dominated by narratives of the intrinsically progressive nature of 
global connections, can also be a history of militant, nationalist, and authoritarian 
movements. 
 To be sure, Berlin’s anticolonialists did not represent the majority. While some 
anticolonial leaders sought support from the Axis, many—from Ho Chi Minh to 
Muhammad Ali Jinnah—supported the war effort of the Allies. We should also not 
forget that Nazi Germany was in competition with other powers to win support in the 
colonial world—as reflected most notably in the promises made by the Allies in the 
Atlantic Charter and in Japan’s efforts to rally anticolonial nationalist movements 
across Asia and beyond.126 There was an anticolonial moment in the Second World 
                                                 
126 Wm. Roger Louis, Imperialism at Bay: The United States and the Decolonization of 
the British Empire, 1941–1945 (Oxford, 1977); Martin Thomas, The French Empire at 
War, 1940–45 (Manchester, 1998); and Ashley Jackson, The British Empire and the 
Second World War (London, 2006), discuss the Allies’ attempts to mobilize the 
colonial world. The literature in note 14 provides insights into Japan’s anticolonial 
policies. 
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War—a prelude to decolonization. The imperial prewar world order was shattered, 
even though the Allies were not immediately willing to give it up. 
 In the last days of the war, Hitler, under siege in his bunker in Berlin, lamented 
the failure of his regime to cooperate more successfully with anticolonial movements, 
telling his secretary, Martin Bormann, that their concessions to Vichy France and their 
loyalty to Fascist Italy in the colonial world had been disastrous: “Never, at any price, 
should we have put our money on France and against the peoples subjected to her 
yoke. On the contrary, we should have helped them to achieve their liberty and, if 
necessary, should have goaded them into doing so.”127 Ironically, Hitler blamed his 
diplomats at the Wilhelmstraße for fostering this alliance with Vichy: “Our 
‘gentlemen’ obviously preferred to maintain cordial relations with distinguished 
Frenchmen, rather than with a lot of hirsute revolutionaries,” he lamented. Similarly, 
he bemoaned the Italian alliance, which had prevented a stronger anticolonial policy in 
the Italian Empire, the French Empire, and beyond: “Had we been on our own, we 
could have emancipated the Moslem countries dominated by France; and that would 
have had enormous repercussions in the Near East, dominated by Britain, and in Egypt. 
But with our fortunes linked to those of the Italians, the pursuit of such a policy was 
not possible.”128 In stark contrast to his earlier statements on Europe’s empires, Hitler’s 
final remarks exemplify the wartime shift in German policies toward the colonial 
world. In the end, for Hitler, his regime’s anticolonial policies had not gone far 
enough. 
                                                 
127 The Testament of Adolf Hitler: The Hitler-Bormann Documents, February–April 
1945, ed. François Genoud, trans. R. H. Stevens (London, 1961), 58–62 (February 14, 
1945), 67 (February 15, 1945), and 69–75 (February 17, 1945) all give insights into 
Hitler’s view of anticolonial movements at the end of the war. Quote from 61. 
128 Ibid., 69–75 (February 17, 1945), here 70. 
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Abstract 
This article sheds light on the history of anti-imperialism in the years of the global 
authoritarian surge of the 1930s and 1940s, looking at the evolving relations between 
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anticolonial nationalists and the Nazi regime. At the height of the Second World War, 
scores of anticolonial revolutionaries flocked to Germany from North Africa, the 
Middle East, and Central and South Asia, turning wartime Berlin into a hub of global 
anti-imperial revolutionary activism. Driven by the contingencies of war, German 
officials made increasing efforts to mobilize anti-imperial movements, reaching out to 
the subjects of the British and French empires and the minorities of the Soviet Union. 
The history of Berlin’s anticolonial nationalists illuminates the broader phenomenon of 
right-wing authoritarian anticolonialism that emerged in the shifting political landscape 
of the interwar years and reached its peak during the Second World War. In this global 
authoritarian moment, many anticolonial nationalists, in search of an alternative to 
(Wilsonian) liberalism and socialism, turned to the rising authoritarian states, which 
stood for the primacy of the nation and a new world order based on the nation, not 
multiethnic empires. Cultivating bonds across imperial, national, and ethnic 
boundaries, they formed a nationalist international against empire, marked by 
anticolonial militancy and reactionary cosmopolitanism. The article also addresses 
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